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E-mail address: syunling@163.com (Y. SonDue to resource constraints, securities regulators cannot ﬁnd or punish all
ﬁrms that have conducted irregular or even illegal activities (hereafter referred
to as fraud). Those who study securities regulations can only ﬁnd the instances
of fraud that have been punished, not those that have not been punished, and it
is these unknown cases that would make the best control sample for studies of
enforcement action criteria. China’s mandatory management earnings fore-
casts solve this sampling problem. In the A-share market, ﬁrms that have
not forecasted as mandated are likely in a position to be punished by securities
regulators or are attempting to escape punishment, and their identiﬁcation
allows researchers to build suitable study and control samples when examining
securities regulations. Our results indicate that enforcement actions taken by
securities regulators are selective. The probability that a ﬁrm will be punished
for irregular management forecasting is signiﬁcantly related to proxies for sur-
vival rates. Speciﬁcally, fraudulent ﬁrms with lower return on assets (ROAs) or
higher cash ﬂow risk are more likely to be punished. Further analysis shows
that selective enforcement of regulations has had little positive eﬀect on the
quality of listed ﬁrms’ management forecasts.
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Due to resource constraints, securities regulators cannot discover and punish all instances of fraud. There-
fore, many ﬁrms escape exposure and/or punishment. This leads to an important line of questioning, namely
how do securities regulators identify questionable ﬁrms to examine? Is their targeting random or selective?
Unfortunately, due to the absence of suitable control samples,1 explorations of securities regulation prefer-
ences are rare. Management earnings forecasts (hereafter referred to as MFs) provide us with the opportunity
to solve this issue. In the A-share market, MFs are mandatory. Firms with performance that meets speciﬁc
criteria must forecast within speciﬁed time periods. Since 2000, some of the ﬁrms that have not forecasted
as mandated have been punished by securities regulators, but most escaped punishment. Under these condi-
tions, samples of ﬁrms that have been ﬁned and ﬁrms that have escaped punishment can be built simulta-
neously (and used as a control sample) with homogeneous instances of fraud, which solves the sampling
problems confronted by researchers.
Our results indicate that the enforcement actions of securities regulators are selective. The probability that a
ﬁrm will be punished for irregular forecasting is signiﬁcantly correlated with proxies for survival rates. Speciﬁ-
cally, fraudulent ﬁrmswith lower return on assets (ROAs) or higher cash ﬂow risk aremore likely to be punished.
From a conservatism perspective, selective enforcement is unquestionable. In China’s one-way trading
system, investors can only proﬁt from increases in stock prices, and the principle of value investment states
that a price increase is the result of good news, while a lower survival rate is the result of bad news. Therefore,
the punishment of ﬁrms using bad news becomes a breaking point. In a market with perfect delisting regula-
tions, most punished ﬁrms disappear from the capital markets (Beasley et al., 1999), making the study of their
post-punishment disclosure behavior impossible. In the A-share market, however, the delisting mechanism
plays almost no role and most punished ﬁrms survive year after year without any instances of delisting. This
provides us with a good opportunity to examine the eﬀects of enforcement actions.
The majority of the enforcement actions against MF irregularities occurred from 2000 to 2002. We examine
the eﬀects of the enforcement actions on the quality of MFs disclosed during the period from 2002 to 2009.
Our results indicate that the eﬀects of enforcement actions were diﬀerent to expectations. First, the preference
for selective enforcement has not proven a signiﬁcant threat. The forecasting precision and accuracy of ﬁrms
with a lower survival probability are still signiﬁcantly lower than those with a higher survival probability. Sec-
ond, the enforcement actions did not signiﬁcantly improve the precision and accuracy of the subsequent fore-
casts issued by the punished ﬁrms.
This study makes two main contributions. First, we resolve the sampling problem that has previously
limited the research on securities regulations. Speciﬁcally, we simultaneously create punished and unpunished
samples with the same irregularity, complementary to the literature represented by Chen et al. (2011). Second,
we examine the eﬀects of enforcement actions on MF quality as one of the important aspects of listing ﬁrms’
information disclosure (Bai, 2009).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and discusses
our research logic. Section 3 discusses the institutional background of management forecasting in China.
Section 4 analyzes the enforcement actions applied to MF irregularities. Section 5 discusses the eﬀects of these
enforcement actions. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.2. Literature and research logic
2.1. Preferences in securities regulation
Beneish (1999) and Dechow et al. (1996) note that due to resource constraints securities regulators cannot
detect and punish all instances of fraud. This reality presents the question: what types of fraud do securities1 Previous studies have only used sample ﬁrms with punished irregularities. They have not used ﬁrms that have not been punished but
have actually had irregularities.
Financial data
Types of performance Data on management forecasts
Compliance sample Irregular sample
Unpunished sample Punished sample
Note: The colored cells represent external data with some hand collection when necessary.  
Fig. 1. Sampling map. Note: The colored cells represent external data with some hand collection when necessary.
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(1988) points out that the SEC pays more attention to newly listed ﬁrms because they are more likely to
commit fraud. According to an analysis of select regulators, Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) suggest that securities
regulators in the US prefer to target listed ﬁrms within 100 miles of their oﬃces, but that this focus does not
necessarily lead to an increase in the probability of being punished. Therefore, their research cannot be clas-
siﬁed as a strict study of enforcement preference. Chen et al. (2011) make a breakthrough by studying ﬁrms
under the special institutional environment in China. They provide evidence that fraudulent ﬁrms owned by
the state received a less serious punishment than those that are not state-owned. These results only cover
fraudulent ﬁrms that have been punished, however, and do not apply to those that have not. Therefore,
although they can examine the degree of punishment, it is impossible for them to study the probability of
being punished. It is this probability that this study aims to explore.
Fig. 1 presents the sampling map. We use the ﬁnancial data of listed ﬁrms to determine performance and
infer the observations obliged by regulation to issue MFs. Comparing the MF records then allows us to ﬁnd
observations that are consistent with MF irregularities, called fraud ﬁrms. Based on enforcement action
records, these fraud ﬁrms can be further classiﬁed into two subgroups: punished and unpunished. Then we
can study the factors inﬂuencing the probability of being punished.2.2. Eﬀects of enforcement actions
From the perspective of securities regulators, punishment is an instrument, not the aim – the fraud occurred
and while punishment cannot change history it can deter future instances of fraud. Therefore, an eﬀective pun-
ishment warns all ﬁrms, including punished ﬁrms. Luo et al. (2005) examine the eﬀect of enforcement actions
by studying whether punished ﬁrms were punished again after the ﬁrst punishment. They ﬁnd that many ﬁrms
have been punished again, many times in some cases, after the ﬁrst punishment. This suggests that the eﬀects
of enforcement actions are not as expected, and although their results are interesting, their sample design has
the same drawback as that of Chen et al. (2011). That is, they only cover the fraudulent ﬁrms that have been
punished without considering their unpunished counterparts – a group that may even represent a majority.
Chen et al. (2005) analyze the market reaction to the disclosure of enforcement actions. They argue that the
CSRC is far from a “toothless tiger” because the market reacts negatively to the disclosure of enforcement
Sample with irregularities in management forecasts
Preference of enforcement History of punishment
Other firms with punished records
Comparison analysis
Other firms without punished records
Other firms in similar situation
Comparison analysis
Other firms in contrast situation
Fig. 2. Research logic for studying the eﬀects of enforcement actions.
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of fraud disclosure rather than the CSRC’s eﬀectiveness.2
We argue that research on the eﬀects of enforcement actions should focus on a longer window. For exam-
ple, Farber (2005) ﬁnds that punished ﬁrms take actions to improve their governance, because investors
appear to value governance improvements.3 In line with that theory, Li (2007) examines how the credit-ﬁle
system established in the Shanghai Securities Exchange and the Shenzhen Securities Exchange impacts the
improvement of the quality of listed ﬁrms’ accounting information. Li uses accounting conservatism as an
indicator of accounting information quality to ﬁnd that the credit-ﬁle system enhances the quality of account-
ing information to a certain extent, but that the result is not as signiﬁcant as expected.
Another method of measuring the eﬀect of fraud punishments is to examine whether regulatory preferences
inﬂuence the behavior of listed ﬁrms. If regulators prefer to target certain fraudulent ﬁrms, the expectation
would be that other ﬁrms in that category would work harder to avoid detection and punishment. In other
words, regulatory preferences should push such ﬁrms to improve the quality of their information disclosure.
Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) provide evidence of this, speciﬁcally that listed ﬁrms within 100 miles of the oﬃces
of securities regulators display a signiﬁcantly lower probability of restatements than their counterparts that are
located further away, because securities regulators in the US are inclined to pay more attention to listed ﬁrms
within 100 miles of their oﬃces.
We use MF quality as an indicator of listed ﬁrms’ information disclosure quality and examine the eﬀects of
enforcement actions in two ways: regulatory preferences and punishment history. Fig. 2 shows our research
logic. If regulatory preferences can change the information disclosure behavior of listed ﬁrms, then other ﬁrms
in similar situations should make MFs of a higher quality. In contrast, if other ﬁrms in similar situations have
not provided MFs of a higher quality, or even of lower quality, then we argue that regulatory preferences do
not provide a suﬃciently strong deterrence.2 Event studies usually examine information content. In the announcement of enforcement actions, the most informative is not the
punishment, but the fraud. In fact, most event studies of enforcement actions (such as Feroz et al., 1991; Wu and Gao, 2002) examine the
information content of fraud disclosures rather than the eﬀectiveness of securities regulators.
3 Firms that take action to improve governance have superior stock price performance, even after controlling for earnings performance.
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higher quality of information when forecasting in subsequent periods. If they have not provided a higher qual-
ity of MFs in subsequent periods, we argue that the punishment did not provide a suﬃciently strong
deterrence.3. Institutional background
3.1. MF regulations
A-share ﬁrms began to issue MFs in the 1998 ﬁscal year. Before that, listed ﬁrms only provided MFs for
approximately three subsequent years when they were targeting an IPO. Following the success of an IPO, few
ﬁrms provided additional information about future earnings. Due to this lack of information, stock prices had
a tendency to ﬂuctuate substantially on future earnings, particularly when loss ﬁrms released their annual
reports. In 1998, securities regulators in China required ﬁrms with a three-year continuous loss or a one-year
material loss to make their MFs on time,4 aiming to alleviate the information asymmetry between listed ﬁrms
and their investors and reduce price ﬂuctuations around the announcements of annual reports (Xue, 2001).
This regulation did not change5 in 1999 and at the close of 2000, MF regulations began to evolve. Panel A
of Table 1 summarizes the key changes to MF regulations.
In the ﬁrst phase, the ﬁrms expected to make MFs were expanded from “a three-year continuous loss or a
one-year material loss” to “a one-year loss”. Meanwhile, the deadline for forecasting was speciﬁed. According
to the Notice with regards to 2000 annual reports,6 “Firms that forecast a loss in 2000 should make MFs
within two months after December 31, 2000. Firms that forecast a three-year continuous loss should make
at least three forecasts within 2 months after December 31, 2000”.
In the second phase, ﬁrms expected to make MFs also included from “loss” to “proﬁt” ﬁrms. According to
the Notice with regards to the interim reports of 2001, ﬁrms that forecast a loss or a big decline in earnings
should make MFs in a timely manner before July 31, 2001 and suspended ﬁrms should make their loss fore-
casts within 15 working days after June 30, 2001. At that time, there were no clear deﬁnitions regarding what
qualiﬁed as a “big” decline in earnings. On September 4, 2001 the Shanghai Securities Exchange and the
Shenzhen Securities Exchange simultaneously criticized ﬁrms that had experienced a big decline in earnings,
but had not forecast them.7 The number of ﬁrms criticized quickly rose to 24, making that day one of the most
notable in the history of securities punishments.
In the third phase, ﬁrms expected to make MFs extended from “bad news” to “good news”, meeting inves-
tors’ fundamental information needs. According to the Notice with regards to the annual reports of 2001, after
the end of the 2001 ﬁscal year ﬁrms that forecasted a big loss or change (an increase or decrease of 50% or
more) in total income compared to the previous year should make MFs within 30 working days after Decem-
ber 31, 2001, while ﬁrms with relatively small comparison bases were exempt from forecasting.8 That Notice
also implemented two changes. First, good news was included for the ﬁrms expected to make MFs, in contrast4 Speciﬁed in the second item of “Notice on the Work of 1998 Annual Reporting”.
5 Speciﬁed in the seventh item of “Notice on the Work of 1999 Annual Reporting”.
6 Speciﬁed in the 10th and 8th items of “Notice on the Work of 2000 Annual Reporting” issued by the Shanghai Securities Exchange and
the Shenzhen Securities Exchange, respectively. Subsequently, the contents of “Notice on the Work of  Periodic Reporting” issued by
the Shanghai Securities Exchange and the Shenzhen Securities Exchange are fundamentally indeterminate. Therefore, we refer to them
hereafter as Notice without pointing out the particular items.
7 According to the Basic Maxim on the Investigation and Settlement of Securities Frauds by Chinese Securities Regulation Commission and
the Maxim on the Evidence of the Investigation and Settlement of Securities Frauds by the Chinese Securities Regulation Commission, the
CSRC can settle a case in one of the following ways: withdraw, circulate a notice of criticism, pay an administrative penalty or transfer to
another institution. Public criticism voiced by the securities exchange is included in the administrative penalty. From August, 1997 the
Shanghai Securities Exchange and the Shenzhen Securities Exchange became subordinate units of the CSRC, making “the behavior
preference of securities exchanges fundamentally similar to that of the CSRC” (Liu, 2006, p. 28). Based on the reality of the authority
system, “securities exchanges really have no authority to settle instances of fraud without the permission of the CSRC” (Liu, 2006, p. 28).
Therefore, we view the “public criticism” voiced by securities exchanges as the intention of the CSRC.
8 The comparison basis is the absolute value of total earnings per share. For annual forecasting, the exempt criterion is 0.05 or less.
Table 1
Changes and details of MF regulations in China.
Criteria of forecasting Forecasting period Deﬁnition of performance Timing of forecasting
Panel A: key changes to MF regulations
December, 1998 Successive losses or material loss Annual Not deﬁned Before disclosure of annual report
December, 2000 Loss After the end of ﬁscal periods
July, 2001 + Big decrease + Interim
December, 2001 + Big increase a Total income
March, 2002 b Net income In the last periodic report
June, 2002 + Quarterly
May, 2006 + Loss to Proﬁt c
Interim forecasts Annual forecasts
Year Deadline Reference Deadline Reference
Panel B: speciﬁed forecasting deadlinesd
2000 NA NA 2001.2.28 Notes
2001 2001.7.31 Notes 2002.2.28 Notes
2002 Not mentioned Notes 2003.2.21 Listing Rules
2003 Not mentioned Notes 2004.2.24 Listing Rules
2004 2004.7.15 Notes 2005.2.1 Notes
2005 2005.7.15 Notes 2006.1.25 Notes
2006 2006.7.31 Listing Rules 2007.1.31 Notes
Net earnings or total earnings
Types Forecasting period Prior period Direction of change Percent of change Exemption
Panel C: deﬁnitions of MF types
Loss Negative Negative or Positive
Loss to proﬁt Positive Negative
Big decrease Positive Positive Negative [50%, 100%) Yes
Big increase Positive Positive Positive P50% Yes
In Panel A, + represents when a new regulation was added. The blank cell represents no change compared to the upper line.
a Exemption is applied. In the forecasting of 2001 annual performance, the exemption basis (comparison basis) was that the absolute
value of total earnings per share was no more than 0.05.
b From 2002, the exemption basis is deﬁned according to the absolute value of net earnings per share. The speciﬁed numbers are 0.05,
0.03 and 0.04 for annual, interim and third-quarter forecasting, respectively.
c Firms with loss to proﬁt are deﬁnitely expected to increase by more than 100%. Before 2006, they were regulated as ﬁrms with big
increases and, therefore, were probably exempt from forecasting. From 2006, they are regulated as an independent class with no
exemption.
d Notes are the “Notes on the work of  Reports” issued by the Shanghai (or Shenzhen) Securities Exchanges, which are funda-
mentally identical. Listing Rules are the Listing Rules of the Shanghai (or Shenzhen) Securities Exchanges. Forecasting deadlines not
speciﬁed in the Notes are deﬁned according to whatever Listing Rules were eﬀective in the corresponding periods. Regulations on
management forecasts as speciﬁed in the Listing Rules are reported in Table 2.
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basis were clearly speciﬁed to improve the feasibility of MFs.
In the fourth phase, the timing of forecasts was shifted from “after the end of ﬁscal periods” to “before the
end of ﬁscal periods”, making the “forecasting” more literal.9 According to the Notice with regards to the ﬁrst
quarter reports of 2001, ﬁrms forecasting a big loss or change (an increase or decrease of 50% or more) in
interim net income should make MFs in their ﬁrst quarter reports. Thus, investors could obtain information
about listed ﬁrms’ future earnings at least two months earlier.
In the ﬁfth phase, beginning from the third quarter reports of 2002, the forecasting of quarterly earnings
was included. Finally, “loss-to-proﬁt” was separated from “big increase”, which makes little diﬀerence. Before9 According to the deﬁnition established by King et al. (1990), MFs are the voluntary disclosure of future earnings before
announcements of actual earnings are made, including forecasts disclosed after the end of ﬁscal periods, but before the announcements of
actual earnings. Research on voluntary disclosure, however, usually focuses on forecasts that have been disclosed before the end of ﬁscal
periods (e.g., Baginski et al., 2008).
Table 2
Regulations for MFs speciﬁed in Listing Rules.
Time SectionsForecasting criteria Forecasting
period







May, 2000 7.4.1 Loss Annual Before disclosure of annual report No No No
June, 2001 7.4.1 Loss Annual Within 30 working days after the end
of the ﬁscal year
No No No
Amendment in the year 2002 did not change regulations for MFs
November,
2004
6.4 Loss, changes in
performance P50%
All No Yes Net income Yes
11.3
May, 2006 11.3 Loss, loss to proﬁt,
changes in
performance P50%







11.3 Loss, loss to proﬁt,
changes in
performance P50%
All Annual forecast must be disclosed within one
month after the end of the ﬁscal year, other
forecasts are not speciﬁed
Not
mentioned
Net income Yes b
a The Listing Rules of the Shenzhen securities exchange do not specify forecasting deadlines, except for the annual forecast.
b Exemption criteria are clearly deﬁned for every period, namely the absolute value of net income per share. The speciﬁed numbers are
0.05, 0.03 and 0.04 for annual, interim and third-quarter forecasting, respectively.
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exemption for “loss-to-proﬁt” ﬁrms.
The securities exchange also magniﬁed their consideration of MFs when amending their Listing Rules.
Table 2 summarizes the speciﬁcations for management forecasts in the current and historic revisions of the
Listing Rules. It is clear that there is always a time lag between the amending of Listing Rules and their prac-
tice. For example, in practice, ﬁrms that experienced big changes were required to forecast from 2001, but the
2002 amendments to the Listing Rules did not reﬂect corresponding changes. In fact, the aforementioned
changes were not made until December 2004.3.2. Punishments for irregular management forecasts
The punishment of irregular management forecasts began with the annual forecasting of 2000 and peaked
during the interim forecasting of 2001. There were sporadic instances after that period, but those punishments
were usually enforced on ﬁrms that had experienced an annual loss. Table 3 summarizes the details of
punishments for irregular management forecasts in the period from 2000 to 2006.10
The eﬃciency of securities regulations, with respect to the period that ﬁrms escaped punishment, is rela-
tively high. Most irregularities are punished within three months. Unreported results indicate that the longest
escape was 239 days and the shortest was a single day.
There are four types of irregular MFs: face-change forecasts, wrong forecasts, no forecasts and delayed
forecasts. “No forecasts” and “delayed forecasts” are easily deﬁned as ﬁrms that are expected to make an
MF (i.e., they fall into one of the four situations listed in Panel C of Table 1) but do not actually make a fore-
cast or forecast after the deadline, respectively (see Table 1 for details). Because the punishment of delayed
forecasts tends to associated with annual reports, delayed forecasts are usually issued in March or April, with
more concentrated in April.
The term “face-change” is from a unique technique of Chuan opera in which characters appear to magically
shift from one painted face to another. When related to capital markets, it is used to portray a dramatic
change in the performance of listed ﬁrms. When talking about MFs speciﬁcally, a face-change forecast is when10 There are a total of 72 observations. We deleted one observation from the ﬁnancial industry, one observation after delisting and one
observation with regards to third-quarter earnings, so 69 observations remain.
Table 3
Details of MF irregularities from releases of enforcement actions.
Escape days a All b Single Irregularity types All Single Actual performance All Single Period All Single
610 7 5 Face-change 21 17 Big decrease 28 26 Interim 25 24
10–20 9 8 Wrong MF 2 1 Loss 40 25 Annual 44 28
20–30 14 13 No MF 29 26 Small increase 1 1 69 52
30–60 25 20 Delayed MF 16 8 69 52
60–90 9 3 Others 1
>90 5 3 69 52
69 52
Face-change map All Single Disclosure time of face-change
MFc
All Single Disclosure time of delayed
MFc
All Single
Big decrease! Loss 6 5 January 1 1 March 2 2
Loss to proﬁt! Continuous
loss
14 11 February 1 1 April 13 6
Big increase! Loss 1 1 March 5 4 June 1 0
21 17 April 14 11 16 8
21 17
a Escape days = gaps between the announcement day for enforcement actions and the discovery day for irregularities, the latter of which
included face-change day for ﬁrms with face-change MFs, forecasting day for ﬁrms with delayed MFs and the announcement day of
periodic reports for ﬁrms with no forecast or wrong forecasts.
b All represents the sample of ﬁrms that engaged in other kinds of fraud besides irregularities in MF; Single represents the sample of
ﬁrms with irregularities in MF only.
c All refers to the month after the end of the forecasting ﬁscal year.
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Song (2011) provide a detailed summary of this concept. Although a face-change forecast is covered by the
changes between “continuous loss” and “loss-to-proﬁt”, only ﬁrms that shift from “good news” to “bad news”
or from “bad news” to “worse news” are punished (Table 3). Due to the uncertainty inherent in forecasting,
regulators usually permit listed ﬁrms to revise their disclosed forecasts when necessary, but always before the
deadlines listed in Panel A of Table 1. That is, ﬁrms that change their forecasts before the deadline will not be
classiﬁed as irregularities by regulators. Therefore, face-change forecasts that are punished are usually
disclosed in March or April of the following year, with the majority concentrated in April.
Theoretically, a wrong forecast means that the forecast performance is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from actual
performance. It is almost impossible to make a 100% correct forecast, however, and it is considered reasonable
to allow for some error. As Table 3 shows, wrong forecasts are deﬁned as ﬁrms that forecast proﬁts when they
actually experience losses. That is, there are qualitative errors.
As for actual performance, most of the punished observations are losses in the forecasting periods, while
the others have a decline that is signiﬁcant enough that only one ﬁrm is punished for overestimating a “small
increase” as a “big increase”. In other words, the probability of being punished is low for ﬁrms with “good
news”, even if they make irregular MFs.3.3. Reasons for the existence of selective enforcement
Chen et al. (2011) provide detailed discussion of the reasons for the existence of selective enforcement in
Chinese securities markets and pay particular attention to the ultimate nature of ﬁrms (i.e., whether they
are state-owned) than to the quality of listed ﬁrms, which is our focus. We argue that in a multiple-player
game, the dominant strategy is to punish fraud ﬁrms whose survival rates are lower in order to maximize
the utility of regulators for the following two reasons.
First, it is a self-protective incentive under the extant regulatory system. Liu (2006) portrays CSRC regu-
lations as “all-around”, noting that, under an all-around regulatory system, the CSRC does not have the
incentive to actively disclose listed ﬁrms’ fraud. The CSRC has an incentive to supervise and publicly disclose
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the Kaili case mentioned by Chen et al. (2011). The CSRC is reluctant to publicly disclose fraudulent infor-
mation detected after a ﬁrm’s IPO. For example, the suspicion that surrounded Lantian’s ﬁnancial data
prompted the CSRC to continuously decline Lantian’s reﬁnancing proposals, despite the fact that the survey
that generated the data did not take place until the break-down of Lantian’s cash chain (Liu, 2006).
Second, it meets the political demands under government control. Luo et al. (2005) pointed out that, “under
the dual pressure to develop and regulate the market, the value orientation of the CSRC is partly dissimilated
as maintaining the stability of stock prices and the securities market, which acquiesces the existence of fraud.
There are diﬀerent penalty criteria in diﬀerent times due to diﬀerent regulatory demands and policies. Some-
times more ﬁrms are punished and the degree of punishment is heavier. In other times, fewer ﬁrms are
punished and the degree of punishment is lighter. That is, the policy-orientation is signiﬁcantly evident”.
The one-way trading system enforces that eﬀect. When investors can only proﬁt from an increase in stock
prices, ﬁrms with “good news” are inevitably protected and favored by stakeholders while ﬁrms with “bad
news” may be neglected. When ﬁrms with “good news” commit fraud, stakeholders are more likely to actively
lobby that those ﬁrms not be punished. When ﬁrms with “bad news” commit fraud, the resulting absence of
lobby pressure allows securities regulators to exercise their authority by punishing them. At that time, stake-
holders tend to stop resisting in the hope that they might receive some compensation in the future.114. Selective enforcement actions for MF irregularities
4.1. Sample and descriptive statistics
According to the penalty records, we can classify the following observations as ﬁrms with irregular MFs: (1)
ﬁrms expected to make a “loss” or “big decline” forecast that fail to make any forecast; (2) ﬁrms expected to
make a “loss” or “big decline” forecast that fail to make any forecast before a stated deadline12; (3) ﬁrms
expected to make a “loss” or “big decline” forecast that fail to forecast correctly before a stated deadline13
and (4) ﬁrms not included in the previous three classes that overestimate their earnings through forecasts that
are inconsistent with actual earnings.14 The details of these observations are reported in Table 4.
Overall, the probability of being punished for MF irregularities is relatively low.15 After 2002, the attention
that regulators paid to irregular annual forecasts and the probability of being punished was signiﬁcantly lower
than it was in 2001. Another interesting point is that about 10% of ﬁrms with MF irregularities were punished
in the following year without any reference to MF irregularities in the announcements of the enforcement
actions.
The ﬁnancial data and market reactions of fraud observations are reported in Table 5. Because our obser-
vations include both annual and interim examples, we use the deciles of ﬁnancial data to avoid potential con-
fusion induced by the diﬀerent lengths of ﬁscal periods.16 We examine the diﬀerence between the punished
sample and the control sample from the perspective of survival rates. The ﬁnancial variables with regards
to survival rates include ROA, CFO, Growth and LEV. ROA measures accounting proﬁtability, CFO
measures liquidity, Growth measures growth ability and LEV measures solvency. The ROA of the punished
observations is concentrated in the lowest quintile, while the observations with ROA in the highest quintile are11 Chen et al. (2011) ﬁnd that punished ﬁrms were given priority in their subsequent reﬁnancing.
12 The deadline for annual forecasting is March 1 of the subsequent year and the deadline for interim forecasting is August 1 of the
current year.
13 The deadline for annual forecasting is March 1 of the subsequent year and the deadline for interim forecasting is August 1 of the
current year.
14 Observations with a “small decrease” or “small increase” in performance (Table 3) fall into this class. Firms with a “small decrease” in
performance might forecast a “small increase” or “big increase”. Firms with a “small increase” in performance might forecast a “big
increase”. Observations with wrong forecasts also include some ﬁrms expected to forecast “big decrease” or “loss” that actually forecasted
higher performance.
15 Among the 697 observations with MF irregularities, ﬁrms punished for irregular MFs represent less than 10%.
16 The corresponding ﬁnancial data of all A-share ﬁrms available in the database are ranked by ﬁscal periods and classiﬁed into ten
groups (deciles).
Table 4
Summary of ﬁrms with MF irregularities.
Form of irregularities Total Those without any punishment next year Those that are punished the next year
MF not involved MF involved Only MF
Panel A: according to the form of irregularities
Face-change 92 63 9 20 16
Delayed MF 164 121 27 16 8
No MF 274 225 21 28 25
Wrong MF 167 152 13 2 1
697 561 70 66 50
Period
Panel B: according to the forecasting period
2000-12-31 16 7 5 4 1
2001-6-30 92 65 4 23 23
2001-12-31 80 63 3 14 13
2002-6-30 76 70 6
2002-12-31 88 76 6 6 4
2003-6-30 24 21 3
2003-12-31 77 59 15 3 3
2004-6-30 26 20 6
2004-12-31 76 60 10 6 4
2005-6-30 19 17 2
2005-12-31 46 36 4 6 1
2006-6-30 43 39 4
2006-12-31 34 28 2 4 1
697 561 70 66 50
Annual 417 329 45 43 27
Interim 280 232 25 23 23
Actual performance a
Panel C: according to actual performance
Small decrease 12 12
Small increase 51 50 1 1
Big decrease 296 253 16 27 25
Loss 338 246 54 38 24
697 561 70 66 50
As indicated, there are a total of 697 observations with MF irregularities, among which 561 observations were free of any punishment in
the following year and will be used as a control sample. The others were punished in the following year for numerous reasons. Among the
136 observations with punishment, 70 observations were punished for irregularities that were not related to MF; the others were punished
for irregularities including irregular MF, and will be used as study sample 1, among which the 50 observations that are punished for
irregular MF only will be used as study sample 2.
a For ﬁrms with small decreases or increases, and those with big decreases or big increases the actual performance of the forecasting
period and that of the compared prior period are both positive. The diﬀerence lies in the direction and magnitude of changes in
performance. Small decrease (increase) refers to a negative (positive) change in performance of less than 50%. Big decrease (increase) refers
to a negative (positive) change in performance of no less than 50%.
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ﬁrms, and those with CFO in the highest quintile are also rarely punished. Fraudulent ﬁrms with Growth in
the highest quintile are signiﬁcantly less likely to be punished than those with Growth in the lowest quintile.
Moreover, we analyze whether investor losses and the nature of the ultimate controller inﬂuence the prob-
ability of being punished, as per Chen et al. (2011). As for the nature of the ultimate controller, most of the
punished ﬁrms are owned by the state, which is in contrast to the results of Chen et al. (2011). We argue that
the diﬀerence is due to diﬀerent sample periods. As Table 4 shows, the punishment of irregular management
forecasts was concentrated in 2001, when almost all ﬁrms were owned by the state. Chen et al. (2011) use a
sample period that ended in 2008. From 2002 to 2008 many private ﬁrms went public through IPOs or the
acquisition of listed ﬁrms, signiﬁcantly lowering the percentage of SOEs among listed ﬁrms. The following
Table 5
Description of independent variables.
Total Those without any punishment next year Those that are punished the next year
MF not involved MF involved Only MF
Net income deﬂated by total assets (ROA)
Lowest 20%a 413 305 57 51 38
Median 263 236 12 15 12
Highest 20% 21 20 1 0 0
CFO deﬂated by total assets (CFO)
Lowest 20% 218 160 27 31 22
Median 414 341 38 35 28
Highest 20% 65 60 5 0 0
Growth of sales (Growth)
Lowest 20% 251 179 36 36 24
Median 352 300 26 26 22
Highest 20% 94 82 8 4 4
Leverage ratio (LEV)
Lowest 20% 105 92 6 7 4
Median 394 327 34 33 28
Highest 20% 198 142 30 26 18
Nature of ultimate control (State)
0 227 179 32 16 8
1 470 382 38 50 42
CAR(1, +1)
Positive 202 170 22 10 8
Negative 495 391 48 56 42
As indicated, there are a total of 697 observations with MF irregularities, among which 561 observations are free of any punishment in the
following year and will be used as a control sample. The others are punished in the following year for numerous reasons. Among the 136
observations with punishment, 70 observations are punished for irregularities that do not relate to MF; the others are punished for
irregularities including irregular MF and will be used as study sample 1, among which the 50 observations that are punished for irregular
MF only will be used as study sample 2.
ROA = Net income deﬂated by total assets; CFO = Cash ﬂow from operating activities deﬂated by total assets; Growth = Change in sales
deﬂated by lagged sales; LEV = Total debt deﬂated by total assets; State = 1 if the ultimate controller is state and zero otherwise;
CAR = Cumulative abnormal returns around [1, +1], and the event day is the discovered day of irregular MF.
a The data of all A-share ﬁrms in the corresponding periods are ranked into ﬁve groups and the quintile distribution of observations used
as our sample is reported.
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disappears.
Chen et al. (2011) also ﬁnd that the degree of punishment is signiﬁcantly positively related to investor losses.
This study also examines the inﬂuence of investor losses, but through an event window around the detection
day17 of the fraud to measure investor losses – a much shorter period than that used by Chen et al. (2011).18 As
Table 5 shows, most of the punished frauds have negative CARs (losses to investors).17 For observations with “wrong forecasts” or “no forecasts”, the detection day is the announcement day of the corresponding periodic
reports. For observations with “delayed forecasts”, the detection day is the forecasting day. For observations with “face-change forecasts”,
the detection day is the day on which the face-change forecasts are released.
18 In the Chen et al. (2011) sample, there is usually a two year or longer “escape period” before the fraudulent ﬁrms are punished by
regulators. Before the announcements of enforcement actions, it is diﬃcult for investors to get information on the existence of fraud by
other measures. Our sample is diﬀerent from theirs in three ways. First, the detection of MF irregularities is relatively simple, with no need
to wait for punishment. Second, we do not ﬁnd when the fraudulent activity begins for “delayed” and “no” forecasts. Finally, there might
be an overlap between the announcements of MFs and actual earnings if we choose a longer event window, which would also introduce
more confounding factors.
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Because the punished observations make up a relatively small percentage of all observations and diﬀerent
sample sizes might inﬂuence the robustness of our results, we use both all sample observations and a matched
sample in our regressions. The regression model is shown as follows:;
19 “ShProbability ðFined ¼ 1Þ ¼ a0 þ a1 Investors’ lossþ a2 Deciles of ROA
þ a3 Deciles of CFOþ a4 Deciles of Growth
þ a5 Deciles of LEV þ a6 Stateþ a7 Size
þ Control Variables þ e
Where; Investors’ loss ¼ the negative of CARs ½1;þ1;
Deciles of var m ¼ the deciles ranked according to var m of all A share firms for the same
fiscal period; where var m represents ROA; CFO; Growth and LEV ; respectively
State ¼ 1 for SOEs and 0 otherwise;
Size ¼ Natural log of total assets: ð1ÞIn the regressions with the full sample, control variables include industry and year dummies. In the regressions
with the matched sample, these control variables are not included because we select matched ﬁrms based on
the same industry, the same forecasting period and the nearest total assets.
Because some observations are punished for reasons besides irregular management forecasts, we exclude
them in the regressions reported in Table 6. That is, in the regressions reported in Table 6, we only use obser-
vations that are punished for irregular management forecasts as our study sample and those without any
punishment in the following year as our control sample. The results indicate that investors’ loss is the most
important factor inﬂuencing the probability of being punished, which is consistent with Chen et al. (2011).
After controlling for investors’ loss, liquidity and growth potential also have signiﬁcant inﬂuences on the prob-
ability of being punished. For example, in regression 3 of panel B, the estimated coeﬃcient on Deciles of CFO
is 0.292, signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In regression 4, the estimated coeﬃcient on Deciles of Growth is 0.156,
signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
4.3. Other potential factors
In the regressions reported in Table 6, observations punished for multiple reasons, including irregular man-
agement forecasts, are excluded. Does that exclusion inﬂuence the robustness of our results? We re-ran the
regressions reported in Table 6 with those observations included and the results (Table 7) are fundamentally
consistent with those in Table 6.
In summary, investor losses resulting from fraud is the primary factor inﬂuencing the probability of being
punished. After controlling for investor losses, enforcement actions still exhibit some “selection bias”. The
probability of being punished is negatively related to the fraudulent ﬁrms’ accounting proﬁtability, liquidity
and growth potential. In other words, ﬁrms with lower survival rates are more likely to be punished.
5. Eﬀects of enforcement actions on quality
In a market with perfect delisting regulations, fraudulent ﬁrms with lower survival rates delist from capital
markets (Beasley et al., 1999), making the study of their post-punishment disclosure behavior impossible. In
the A-share market, however, due to the scarcity of “shell resources”,19 most fraudulent ﬁrms survive year
after year without any instances of delisting, even if their survival rates are lower or they are technically
bankrupt. This may impair the eﬃcient allocation of resources, but it also provides us with an opportunity
to examine the subsequent eﬀects of punishments.ell resources” means the qualiﬁcation of listing.
Table 6
Results for sample with irregular MF only.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Panel A: results for all sample (N = 548)
Intercept 2.654 2.328 2.837* 2.723 2.489
(1.662) (1.668) (1.694) (1.663) (1.702)
CAR 25.683*** 24.059*** 24.459*** 25.302*** 22.590***
(4.531) (4.589) (4.567) (4.544) (4.656)
Deciles of ROA 0.305* 0.286*
(0.170) (0.171)
Deciles of CFO 0.152* 0.142
(0.085) (0.087)
Deciles of growth 0.127* 0.107
(0.075) (0.076)
Deciles of LEV 0.062 0.016 0.072 0.078 0.041
(0.074) (0.077) (0.075) (0.075) (0.080)
State 0.775 0.660 0.823 0.895 0.791
(0.551) (0.545) (0.556) (0.555) (0.554)
Size 0.119 0.037 0.049 0.080 0.048
(0.230) (0.234) (0.238) (0.229) (0.241)
Industry & year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Rescaled R2 (%) 43.20 44.38 44.30 44.18 46.11
Panel B: results for matched sample (N = 96)
Intercept 1.061 1.020 1.285 0.923 1.052
(2.027) (2.023) (2.059) (2.025) (2.070)
CAR 14.384*** 14.057*** 12.185** 14.989*** 12.522**
(4.810) (4.848) (4.799) (4.885) (4.913)
Deciles of ROA 0.087 0.072
(0.169) (0.188)
Deciles of CFO 0.292*** 0.293***
(0.104) (0.105)
Deciles of growth 0.156* 0.173*
(0.091) (0.099)
Deciles of LEV 0.023 0.007 0.023 0.007 0.010
(0.081) (0.087) (0.085) (0.083) (0.093)
State 0.610 0.594 0.746 0.806 0.922
(0.660) (0.660) (0.687) (0.664) (0.695)
Size 0.030 0.003 0.123 0.005 0.172
(0.284) (0.288) (0.299) (0.284) (0.303)
Rescaled R2 (%) 17.06 17.38 27.47 20.69 31.02
The study sample is only ﬁrms punished for MF irregularities. In panel A, the control sample did not receive any punishment in the
following year despite having MF irregularities. In panel B, the control sample is matched with the same forecasting period, industry, form
of MF irregularities and the nearest size of total assets based on the control sample in panel A.
Standard error in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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sons. First, management forecasts are an important part of listed ﬁrms’ information disclosure and the quality
of management forecasts can represent the quality of information disclosure (Bai, 2009).20 Second, it is easier
to measure the quality of management forecasts without any sophisticated statistical models or subjective20 Bai (2009) ﬁnds that there is a signiﬁcant positive relation between the information disclosure rating issued by the Shenzhen Securities
Stock Exchange and the quality of management forecasts. Research on developed markets reveals that the quality of management
forecasts is often used as a proxy for the quality of listed ﬁrms’ information disclosure: see, for example, Graham et al. (2005) and Wang
(2007).
Table 7
Results for sample with irregularities including irregular MF.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Panel A: results for all sample (N = 564)
Intercept 1.799 1.477 1.932 1.877 1.605
(1.357) (1.358) (1.385) (1.372) (1.407)
CAR 20.024*** 18.775*** 18.781*** 19.720*** 17.328***
(3.397) (3.459) (3.436) (3.441) (3.532)
Deciles of ROA 0.303** 0.279*
(0.143) (0.143)
Deciles of CFO 0.187*** 0.186**
(0.072) (0.075)
Deciles of growth 0.167** 0.158**
(0.066) (0.066)
Deciles of LEV 0.081 0.040 0.096 0.098 0.072
(0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.065)
State 0.393 0.304 0.408 0.511 0.405
(0.397) (0.396) (0.403) (0.399) (0.405)
Size 0.146 0.075 0.069 0.093 0.036
(0.188) (0.190) (0.196) (0.190) (0.199)
Industry & year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Rescaled R2 (%) 33.84 35.32 35.95 35.89 39.08
Panel B: results for matched sample (N = 124)
Intercept 0.353 0.359 0.640 0.210 0.503
(1.767) (1.764) (1.819) (1.776) (1.832)
CAR 9.368*** 9.161** 7.636** 9.907*** 8.213**
(3.564) (3.571) (3.579) (3.668) (3.682)
Deciles of ROA 0.075 0.052
(0.156) (0.174)
Deciles of CFO 0.318*** 0.318***
(0.094) (0.095)
Deciles of growth 0.183** 0.195**
(0.079) (0.086)
Deciles of LEV 0.049 0.037 0.048 0.035 0.024
(0.069) (0.073) (0.072) (0.070) (0.078)
State 0.670 0.665 0.801 0.879* 1.004*
(0.480) (0.481) (0.506) (0.493) (0.519)
Size 0.124 0.100 0.043 0.093 0.097
(0.251) (0.255) (0.264) (0.251) (0.270)
Rescaled R2 (%) 11.00 11.23 23.44 16.46 28.21
The study sample is ﬁrms punished for items including MF irregularities. In panel A, the control sample did not receive any punishment in
the following year despite having MF irregularities. In panel B, the control sample is matched with the same forecasting period, industry,
form of MF irregularities and the nearest size of total assets based on the control sample in panel A.
Standard error in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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for irregular management forecasts, but the best way to examine the eﬀects of these punishments is to measure
their eﬀects on subsequent management forecasts.
We examine the precision and accuracy of annual MFs issued by A-share ﬁrms from 2002 to 2009.21 Extant
research argues that MF quality is positively related to their precision and accuracy.
We examine the eﬀects of punishments in two ways. First, we ask whether the preference of enforcement
actions inﬂuences the disclosure behavior of other ﬁrms. Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) ﬁnd that listed ﬁrms21 We use the latest forecasts for ﬁrms that issue more than one forecast with regards to the same forecasting year.
Table 8
MF precision for observations with extreme values from 2002 to 2009.
Precision Highest deciles Lowest deciles Totals
Obs. Percent (%) Obs. Percent (%) Obs. Percent (%)
CFO deﬂated by total assets (CFO)
Qualitative estimate 106 19.70 253 38.70 359 30.10
Open-end estimate 190 35.40 133 20.30 323 27.10
Interval estimate 142 26.40 144 22.00 286 24.00
Point estimate 99 18.40 124 19.00 223 18.70
537 654 1191
Ratio testa v2 = 49.37***
Net income deﬂated by total assets (ROA)
Qualitative estimate 54 9.90 622 60.70 676 43.00
Open-end estimate 193 35.30 28 2.70 221 14.10
Interval estimate 196 35.90 103 10.00 299 19.00
Point estimate 103 18.90 272 26.50 375 23.90
546 1025 1571
Ratio testa v2 = 372.84***
Growth of sales (Growth)
Qualitative estimate 187 26.50 421 52.80 608 40.40
Open-end estimate 210 29.70 104 13.00 314 20.90
Interval estimate 180 25.50 103 12.90 283 18.80
Point estimate 129 18.30 170 21.30 299 19.90
706 798 1504
Ratio testa v2 = 106.25***
Leverage ratio (LEV)
Qualitative estimate 475 57.10 90 19.20 565 43.50
Open-end estimate 79 9.50 115 24.60 194 14.90
Interval estimate 93 11.20 176 37.60 269 20.70
Point estimate 185 22.20 87 18.60 272 20.90
832 468 1300
Ratio testa v2 = 173.19***
 Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
 Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
a The ratio test examines whether the distribution of qualitative and quantitative forecasts in the highest and lowest deciles of the
corresponding ﬁnancial data is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
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counterparts located further away because securities regulators in the US are inclined to pay more attention to
listed ﬁrms within 100 miles of their oﬃces. This means that the preferences of regulators can change the
expectation of listed ﬁrms and has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the disclosure behavior of other ﬁrms. We ﬁnd
that regulators are inclined to punish fraudulent ﬁrms with lower proﬁtability, lower liquidity and lower
growth potential. Does this regulatory preference improve the quality of MFs issued by ﬁrms in similar
situations? We rank the corresponding ﬁnancial data of all of the A-share ﬁrms available to get deciles by ﬁscal
year. Then we choose MFs issued by ﬁrms that fall in the highest deciles or lowest deciles with the aim of
examining whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the MF quality among ﬁrms in diﬀerent deciles.
Second, we examine whether ﬁrms that have been punished for MF irregularities improve the quality of
their subsequent forecasts to improve their image. Farber (2005) ﬁnds that punished ﬁrms take actions to
improve their governance and improve the quality of their information disclosure. Because there is still con-
troversy over whether corporate governance plays a role in A-share markets,22 we use the quality of informa-
tion disclosure to directly measure the eﬀects of punishment. The dependent variables are the precision and22 Another consideration is that most governance mechanisms for A-share ﬁrms are mandatorily planted, rather than voluntarily
developed.
Table 9
Distribution of MF precision from 2002 to 2009.
Precision All observations Not ﬁned Fined_MF Fined_ALL
Qualitative estimate 1613 1274 75 339
Open-end estimate 1320 1244 13 76
Range estimate 1361 1244 12 117
Point estimate 1068 887 26 181





















Fig. 3. Distribution of forecast precision. Note: “Not-Fined” indicates ﬁrms that did not receive any punishment during the previous three
years. “Fined_MF” indicates ﬁrms that were punished for MF irregularities, while “Fined_All” indicates ﬁrms that were punished for
irregularities that did not necessarily include MF irregularities during the previous three years.
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forecaPrecision ¼ f ðFined MF ; Control VariablesÞ ð2Þ
Accuracy ¼ f ðFined MF ; Control VariablesÞ ð3Þwhere Fined_MF equals 1 if the ﬁrm has been punished for an irregular MF in the past three years, and 0
otherwise.
The control variables are chosen according to the extant literature, including earnings volatility (Rank of
EV, measuring forecasting diﬃculty), the level of earnings (ROA), the timing of forecasts (Month), an index of
ﬁnancial distress (ST) and indices of corporate governance (State and Herf5), ﬁrm size, industry and year
dummies.23
We also examine whether the punishments induced by other irregularities inﬂuence MF quality. The regres-
sion models are shown as follows:Precision ¼ f ðFined ALL; Control VariablesÞ ð4Þ
Accuracy ¼ f ðFined ALL; Control VariablesÞ ð5Þginski and Hassell (1997) ﬁnd that ﬁrms of small size with less earnings volatility are more likely to issue management forecasts with
precision. Ajinkya et al. (2005) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher earnings volatility provide less accurate management forecasts. Johnson
001), Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) all ﬁnd that the accuracy of management forecasts that are disclosed
is lower than that of those that are disclosed later. Eames and Glover (2003) argue that the level of earnings must be controlled for
examining forecasting errors. Koch (2002) ﬁnds that ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress are more likely to issue misleading management
sts. Johnson et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the accuracy of management forecasts has a signiﬁcantly negative relation to ﬁrm size.
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years, and 0 otherwise. The control variables are the same as those in Eqs. (2) and (3).5.1. Eﬀects of punishment on MF precision
Table 8 analyzes whether regulatory punishment preferences inﬂuence MF precision. It is evident that pun-
ishment preferences do not eﬃciently deter other ﬁrms. For example, observations with CFO in the highestTable 10
Eﬀects of enforcement on MF precision from 2002 to 2009.
All samples Matched samples All samples Matched samples
Panel A: MF precision is grouped into two levels
Intercept 1.622*** 2.886** 1.603*** 2.308***





Rank of EV 0.457*** 0.375*** 0.459*** 0.292***
(0.018) (0.067) (0.018) (0.027)
ROA 2.663*** 1.851** 2.721*** 2.367***
(0.274) (0.724) (0.278) (0.324)
Month 0.621*** 0.518*** 0.618*** 0.547***
(0.041) (0.117) (0.041) (0.059)
ST 1.320*** 0.242 1.369*** 0.667***
(0.107) (0.354) (0.110) (0.147)
State 0.145 0.075 0.132 0.297**
(0.091) (0.339) (0.091) (0.133)
Herf5 0.952*** 1.328 0.986*** 0.546
(0.339) (1.249) (0.340) (0.581)
Size 0.105*** 0.151 0.105*** 0.045
(0.041) (0.182) (0.041) (0.067)
Industry &year Controlled Controlled
Rescaled R2 (%) 53.21 32.78 53.27 30.19
Obs. 5362 252 5362 1414
Panel B: MF Precision is Grouped into Four Levels
Intercept 3 2.516*** 0.486 2.552*** 0.530
(0.232) (1.165) (0.232) (0.396)
Intercept 2 1.058*** 1.238 1.091*** 0.466
(0.231) (1.166) (0.231) (0.396)
Intercept 1 0.394* 2.091* 0.363 1.237***





Rank_EV 0.154*** 0.256*** 0.157*** 0.142***
(0.010) (0.053) (0.010) (0.020)
ROA 1.427*** 1.311** 1.472*** 1.597***
(0.163) (0.519) (0.165) (0.222)
Month 0.624*** 0.491*** 0.621*** 0.537***
(0.026) (0.096) (0.026) (0.044)
ST 0.594*** 0.064 0.668*** 0.255**
(0.080) (0.316) (0.082) (0.126)
State 0.016 0.053 0.004 0.196*
(0.058) (0.290) (0.058) (0.108)
(continued on next page)
Table 10 (continued)
All samples Matched samples All samples Matched samples
Herf5 0.308 1.372 0.330 0.785*
(0.221) (1.093) (0.221) (0.475)
Size 0.150*** 0.155 0.148*** 0.052
(0.025) (0.157) (0.025) (0.053)
Industry & year Controlled Controlled
Rescaled R2 (%) 33.89 22.52 34.03 17.99
Obs. 5362 252 5362 1414
In panel A, MF precision is grouped into two levels: for quantitative forecasts, precision equals 1 and for qualitative forecasts, precision
equals 0.
In panel B, MF precision is grouped into four levels: for general impression forecasts, precision equals 0 while for open-interval, closed-
interval and point estimates, precision equals 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Fined_MF equals 1 if the observation was punished for MF irregularities in the past three years, and 0 otherwise.
Fined_ALL equals 1 if the observation was punished (not necessarily for MF irregularities) in the past three years, and 0 otherwise.
The RANK of EV is calculated as follows. We ﬁrst calculated EV as the standard deviation of net incomes in the past three years, deﬂated
by the absolute value of their mean. Then we ranked the EV of all the observations (5362) by year into ten groups.
ROA = net income/total assets, winsorized at 1% and 99% of all samples by ﬁscal year.
ST is equals 1 if the ﬁrm was in ST, or ST when the MF was disclosed, and 0 otherwise.
Month is equals 1 if the MF was disclosed before the end of the ﬁscal year and the month of disclosure otherwise.
State is equals 1 if the ultimate controller or local government were central, and 0 otherwise.
Herf5 is the sum of the square of the percentage holdings for the ﬁve largest shareholders.
Size equals the log of the total assets.
The study sample was chosen from ﬁrms with Fined_MF (or Fined_ALL) values equaling 1, and the control sample was chosen from ﬁrms
with Fined_ALL values equaling 0, matched with the same forecasting period, industry and nearest total assets.
Standard error in parentheses.
* signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 11
Errors of MFs for Observations with Extreme Values from 2002 to 2009.
MFE Highest deciles Lowest deciles Totals
Obs. Percent (%) Obs. Percent (%) Obs. Percent (%)
CFO deﬂated by total assets (CFO)
610% 42 9.80 139 34.70 181 21.80
(10%, 10%] 207 48.30 165 41.10 372 44.80
>10% 180 42.00 97 24.20 277 33.40
429 401 830
Net income deﬂated by total assets (ROA)
610% 26 5.30 173 42.90 199 22.30
(10%, 10%] 294 59.90 201 49.90 495 55.40
>10% 171 34.80 29 7.20 200 22.40
491 403 894
Growth of sales (Growth)
610% 61 11.80 162 43.00 223 24.90
(10%, 10%] 240 46.20 139 36.90 379 42.30
>10% 218 42.00 76 20.20 294 32.80
519 377 896
Leverage ratio (LEV)
610% 118 33.10 91 24.10 209 28.40
(10%, 10%] 127 35.60 199 52.60 326 44.40
>10% 112 31.40 88 23.30 200 27.20
357 378 735
MFE = (NETactual  NETforecasted)/|NETforecasted|, where NETactual is actual net income and NETforecasted is the forecasted net income in
the MF.
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Table 12
MF accuracy for observations with extreme values from 2002 to 2009.
Quartile of accuracy Highest deciles Lowest deciles Totals
Obs. Percent (%) Obs. Percent (%) Obs. Percent (%)
CFO deﬂated by total assets (CFO)
1 91 21.2 124 30.9 215 25.9
2 93 21.7 88 21.9 181 21.8
3 128 29.8 94 23.4 222 26.7
4 117 27.3 95 23.7 212 25.5
429 401 830
Ratio testa v2 = 6.56**
Net income deﬂated by total assets (ROA)
1 64 13.0 89 22.1 153 17.1
2 94 19.1 95 23.6 189 21.1
3 149 30.3 101 25.1 250 28.0
4 184 37.5 118 29.3 302 33.8
491 403 894
Ratio testa v2 = 14.18***
Growth of sales (Growth)
1 118 22.7 137 36.3 255 28.5
2 122 23.5 80 21.2 202 22.5
3 141 27.2 82 21.8 223 24.9
4 138 26.6 78 20.7 216 24.1
519 377 896
Ratio testa v2 = 13.92***
Leverage ratio (LEV)
1 125 35.0 68 18.0 193 26.3
2 84 23.5 86 22.8 170 23.1
3 87 24.4 96 25.4 183 24.9
4 61 17.1 128 33.9 189 25.7
357 378 735
Ratio testa v2 = 39.06***
a The ratio test examines whether the distribution of highest deciles and lowest deciles in the lowest and highest quartile of accuracy is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, where Accuracy = 1/|MFE|.
 Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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former’s MFs are higher than those of the latter’s.
Table 9 reports the precision of annual MFs issued by A-share ﬁrms from 2002 to 2009, and Fig. 3 portrays
the distribution of forecast precision. We can see that the precision of subsequent MFs issued by ﬁrms pun-
ished for irregular MFs are signiﬁcantly lower than that of unpunished ﬁrms. The precision of subsequent
MFs issued by ﬁrms punished for all irregularities is higher than that of unpunished ﬁrms. This diﬀerence
might be the result of timing, with punishments for MF irregularities concentrated in 2001 and with subse-
quent MFs issued from 2002 to 2004, when the quality of all listed ﬁrms’ MFs was improving. Therefore,
it is necessary to control for other factors that inﬂuence MF quality.
Because the precision of MFs is an ordinal variable, we run the regressions with logit or ordered-logit. As
the percentage of punished observations is relatively low, we also use a matched sample to avoid potential
confusion introduced by diﬀerent sample sizes. The regression results are reported in Table 10.
It is clear that after controlling for factors inﬂuencing MF precision, the estimated coeﬃcient of Fined_MF
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero – indicating that the eﬀects of such punishments are not as expected. The
estimated coeﬃcient of Fined_ALL is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that the eﬀects of such punishments are
somewhat signiﬁcant. Comparing the results of Fined_MF and Fined_ALL, we argue that one explanation for
Table 13
Distribution of annual MF accuracy from 2002 to 2009.
MFE All observations Not_Fined Fined_MF Fined_ALL
680% 170 150 3 20
(80%, 50%] 192 171 5 21
(50%, 20%] 327 292 5 35
(20%, 10%] 293 262 5 31
(10%, 10%] 1629 1465 21 164
(10%, 20%] 394 361 6 33
(20%, 50%] 400 369 2 31
(50%, 80%] 121 110 1 11
>80% 218 191 3 27
3744 3371 51 373
MFE = (NETactual  NETforecasted)/|NETforecasted|, where NETactual is the actual net income while NETforecasted is the MF’s forecasted net
income.
Not_Fined represents observations that did not receive any punishment in the past three years.
Fined_MF represents observations that were punished for MF irregularities in the past three years.


















(-10%,10%] (10%,20%] (20%,50%] (50%,80%] >80%
MFE
Fined_MF Fined_ALL Not_Fined
Fig. 4. Distribution of forecast errors. Note: MFE = (NETactual  NETforecasted)/|NETforecasted|, where NETactual is actual net income and
NETforecasted is the forecasted net income in the MF. “Not-Fined” are ﬁrms that were not punished during the previous three years.
“Fined_MF” are ﬁrms that were punished for MF irregularities and “Fined_All” are ﬁrms that were punished for irregularities that did
not necessarily include MF irregularities during the previous three years.
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insuﬃciently strong deterrence eﬀect.245.2. Eﬀects of punishment on MF accuracy
We classify MFs into three groups: overestimated, accurate and underestimated. MFs predict activities and
it is almost impossible to be 100% accurate. An accurate forecast is one for which forecasted earnings are24 Punishment for irregular management forecasts usually takes the form of public criticism, which is lighter than a public ﬁne. For
example, the inﬂuence of public criticism on the qualiﬁcation of reﬁnancing is only one year, while that of a public ﬁne is three years.
Moreover, Luo et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the probability of being punished again is lower for ﬁrms that have received a public ﬁne, suggesting
that public ﬁnes oﬀer the strongest deterrence.
Table 14
Eﬀects of enforcement on the accuracy of annual MFs from 2002 to 2009.
All samples Matched samples All samples Matched samples
Intercept 6.477*** 9.925*** 6.434*** 5.716***





Rank of EV 0.331*** 0.522*** 0.334*** 0.267***
(0.017) (0.103) (0.018) (0.040)
ROA 3.873*** 6.126*** 3.903*** 3.034***
(0.463) (2.042) (0.463) (0.678)
Loss 1.515*** 1.686** 1.514*** 1.202***
(0.172) (0.802) (0.171) (0.330)
Month 0.541*** 0.759*** 0.538*** 0.544***
(0.045) (0.193) (0.045) (0.089)
State 0.037 0.757 0.043 0.492**
(0.097) (0.588) (0.097) (0.211)
Size 0.199*** 0.697** 0.193*** 0.159*
(0.039) (0.287) (0.039) (0.089)
Industry and year Controlled Controlled
Adjusted R2 12.91% 31.51% 12.95% 10.96%
Obs. 3744 100 3744 740
Notes: The dependent variable RANK of ACCURACY was calculated as follows. First, we ﬁrst calculated FE as the absolute value of the
diﬀerence between actual net income and the net income forecasted by management, deﬂated by the absolute value of the net income
forecasted by management with ACCURACY as the inverse of FE. Then we ranked the ACCURACY of all observations (3744) by year
into 10 groups.
Fined_MF equals 1 if the observation was punished for MF irregularities in the past three years, and 0 otherwise.
Fined_ALL equals 1 if the observation was punished (not necessarily for MF irregularities) in the past three years, and 0 otherwise.
The RANK of EV was calculated as follows. First, we calculated EV as the standard deviation of net incomes in the past three years,
deﬂated by the absolute value of their mean. Then we ranked the EV of all observations (3744) by year into 10 groups.
ROA = net income/total assets, winsorized at 1% and 99% of all samples by ﬁscal year.
Loss is equals 1 if the actual net income for the forecasting year is negative, and 0 otherwise.
Month is equals 1 if the MF is disclosed before the end of the ﬁscal year, and the month of disclosure otherwise.
State equals 1 if the ultimate controller or local government is central, and 0 otherwise.
Size is equal to the log of total assets.
The study sample is those ﬁrms with Fined_MF (or Fined_ALL) values equaling 1, and the control sample is chosen from those ﬁrms with
Fined_ALL values equaling 0, matched with the same forecasting period, industry and the nearest total assets.
Standard error in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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more than 10%, we classify the forecast as “overestimated” or “underestimated”, according to the sign of
the diﬀerence between the forecast earnings and the actual earnings. Our previous results indicate that pun-
ishment for MF irregularities is rarely enforced on “good news”. The only times “good news” is punished
is when the forecast is “overestimated”. In other words, overestimation is not welcomed by regulators, but
does this preference impact the tendency of target ﬁrms to overestimate? The results in Table 11 indicate that
it does not.
For example, the percentage of overestimation is 9.8% and 34.7% for observations in the highest deciles of
CFO and those in the lowest deciles, respectively, with the latter three times higher than the former. In con-
trast, their corresponding percentage of underestimation is 42.0% and 24.2%, respectively, with the latter
much lower than the former.
Accuracy is measured by the inverse of absolute MFE (MF error, see Table 12 for its deﬁnition). To avoid
the inﬂuence of extreme values, we use the rank of Accuracy (from 9 for the highest deciles to 0 for the lowest
deciles) in our regressions. To save space, the results reported in Table 12 are based on quintiles.
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percentage of lowest accuracy is 30.9% for observations with CFO falling in the lowest deciles, which is higher
than that of observations with CFO falling in the highest deciles (21.2%). In contrast, the percentage of highest
accuracy is 23.7% and 27.3% for observations with CFO falling in the lowest and highest deciles, respectively.
The v2 of the ratio test is 6.56, which is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The accuracy of all MFs issued by A-share ﬁrms from 2002 to 2009 is reported in Table 13. Fig. 4 portrays
the distribution of forecast accuracy. The accuracy results are similar to those for forecast precision. That is,
ﬁrms punished for MF irregularities still have lower accuracy in their subsequent forecasts than other ﬁrms,
indicating no signiﬁcant improvements. Meanwhile, the accuracy of subsequent MFs issued by ﬁrms punished
for all irregularities is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of unpunished ﬁrms.
The regression results are reported in Table 14. After controlling for factors that inﬂuence MF accuracy,
the estimated coeﬃcients for Fined_MF and Fined_ALL are all insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating
that the punished ﬁrms did not improve their subsequent forecast accuracy to please regulators.
6. Conclusions
We use irregular MFs from 2000 to 2006 to examine whether the resulting enforcement actions are selective.
Our results indicate that enforcement actions by securities regulators are selective. All things being equal, the
probability of being punished for irregular MF is signiﬁcantly related to proxies for survival rates. Speciﬁcally,
fraud ﬁrms with a lower ROA or a higher risk of cash ﬂows are more likely to be punished.
Most enforcement actions for MF irregularities occurred from 2000 to 2002. Therefore, we examine the
eﬀects of enforcement actions based on MF quality, in disclosures from 2002 to 2009. Our results indicate that
the eﬀects of enforcement actions fall far from expectations. First, the preference for selective enforcement has
not proven a signiﬁcant threat. The forecasting precision and accuracy of ﬁrms with a lower survival proba-
bility were still signiﬁcantly lower than those with a higher survival probability. Second, enforcement actions
did not signiﬁcantly improve the precision and accuracy of subsequent forecasts issued by punished ﬁrms.
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